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1 
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES 
 
 
PREAMBLE 
 
When scrutinizing executive actions for unlawful command influence, this 
Court must account for a president’s immense power over the military.  The extant 
judicial test for unlawful command influence – a violation of due process in the 
military setting – is a contextual one, and hence must consider the unique and 
unparalleled authority of the Commander-In-Chief over the military and individual 
service-members when the president’s actions are at issue.  This executive power 
should also be evaluated in light of its myriad, and historically important, 
constitutional and statutory constraints – some predating the birth of the United 
States – that appropriately continue to shape U.S. military law.   
A defect in due process of the magnitude associated with this appeal should 
be directly addressed and cured by an appellate court. Presidential interference in 
the administration of military justice by the current Commander-In-Chief has 
reached unprecedented levels.1  Even recent lawful actions by the President in the 
military justice arena have created potentially broad, harmful ripple effects.  See 
e.g., “Esper to urge Trump not to intervene in cases of service members facing war 
 
1 In late July 2019, President Trump publicly ordered the Secretary of the Navy to rescind Navy achievement medals 
for the prosecution in the court-martial “United States v. Chief Petty Officer Eddie Gallagher.”  President Trump’s 
express reasons for doing so included the inability of the prosecutors to “win.”  See, e.g., Colby Itkowitz, Trump 
Orders Lawyers’ Achievement Awards Revoked in Navy SEAL Murder Case, Washington Post, July 31, 2019.   
 
 
2 
crimes allegations,” CNN, November 6, 2019.  On November 15, 2009, the 
president exercised his constitutional authority and granted pardons to two service-
members regarding war crimes; he also restored the rank of a third service member 
convicted of a war crime, despite recommendations against such actions from his 
civilian and military defense leadership.  See, e.g., Dave Phillips, “Trump’s 
Pardons for Servicemen Raise Fears That Laws of War Are History,” November 
16, 2019.   
These actions, albeit within the President’s scope of lawful authority, 
triggered substantial criticism and, more importantly, expressions of concern that 
his interventions will undermine good order and discipline by discrediting the 
military justice system.  If lawful presidential interventions in the military justice 
process create the perception (if not reality) of undermining good order and 
discipline and corroding confidence in the military justice system, it is axiomatic 
that unlawful interventions will produce a profoundly more troubling effect.  It is 
therefore logical to infer that unlawful executive actions – here, the President’s 
ratification of campaign-trial vilifications of Appellant during Appellant’s court-
martial, and the President’s sentencing-day tweet censuring Appellant’s military 
judge – risk even greater second-order systemic consequences.   
The Commander-In-Chief wields far greater authority over military matters 
than any other commander or civilian defense official.  As a result, the presidential 
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bully pulpit magnifies the deleterious consequences of the Commander-In-Chief’s 
unlawful and improper efforts to influence the military justice system.  Presidential 
conduct such as that associated with this appeal, therefore, most certainly created 
the appearance of unlawful command influence, no matter how diligent 
subordinate commanders and members of the military legal profession may have 
been in seeking to shield the process from this effect.  Hence we believe this court 
should hold that in cases of actual or apparent unlawful command influence 
resulting from presidential statements or actions, the presumptive remedy must be 
dismissal.  No other remedy matches the powerfully corrosive effect of the 
executive’s erosion of the public’s confidence in the military justice system. 
INTEREST OF AMICUS 
All amici are law professors and veterans.  As former judge advocates, we 
have over 60 years of active-duty service amongst us, including combat zone 
deployments.  We each have also deeply studied military law and its history.  We 
believe the merits of the unlawful command influence at the Appellant’s trial and 
appellate court level have not been properly resolved.  We urge this Court to 
condemn the lack of due process evidenced by President Trump’s exercise of 
apparent unlawful influence in Appellant’s court-martial, noting that presidential 
influence in this case is unique in the annals of United States military history – to 
the detriment of military law.  An objective, disinterested observer would believe 
 
 
4 
there is an erosion in the fairness of the military justice system when a president 
acts to influence the outcome of the adjudicative process by issuing statements or 
pronouncements that, due to his position, carry the imprimatur of authority 
regarding pending outcomes of a court-martial.  As this Court is the first level of 
review not subject to military orders, it is appropriate now to raise the arguments 
contained within this brief.  
ARGUMENT 
I.  PRESIDENTIAL POWER OF PERSUASION IS MAGNIFIED IN 
COMMAND CONTEXT AND ITS ABUSE IS WITHIN SCOPE OF 
STATUTORY PROHIBITION     
 
The power of the President, according to Professor Neustadt, is the power to 
persuade.2  While this observation generally applies to the citizenry as a whole, the 
Constitution empowers the President to command the nation’s military forces.  
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  Hence, in the military context, his power to persuade 
becomes the power to demand obedience.  When and where the presidential power 
of persuasion exercised within the military justice system violates due process by 
eroding the legitimacy of the system, or by unlawfully reducing the independence 
of its players, are questions appropriately before this Court.  While we agree with 
the facts and argument raised by Appellant, as well as with the conclusions found 
 
2 RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS:  THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP, 30 
(1990). 
 
 
5 
in Judge Ewing’s dissent, we separately argue for a context-appropriate approach 
to extending the prohibition of and remedies for unlawful command influence to 
situations involving presidential interference with military justice process – 
application of which merits Appellant relief. 
When charting the contours of lawful executive action in military justice, it 
is essential to first note that Congress possesses the constitutional authority “to 
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces.”  
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.  See also Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 438 
(1987).  Exercising this power, Congress has delegated to the President the 
authority to create procedural rules over military personnel subject to the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).  See, e.g., United States v. Tanner, 61 M.J. 649, 
651 (N.M.C.C.A. 2005).3  Thus, the President has not only the authority to issue 
orders to the armed forces, he or she may also exert a substantial measure of 
control over the military’s judicial processes.  Finally, this Court has the authority 
to address the impact of presidential conduct on courts-martial.  See, e.g., Ortiz v. 
United States, 585 U.S. __ (2018). 
Pursuant to its constitutional power, in 1950 Congress enacted Article 37 of 
the UCMJ prohibiting “unlawful command influence.”  Congress did so for the 
 
3 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2019).  It must be noted that the President’s power is limited to issuing rules consistent 
with the Constitution.  See, e.g., United States v. Kelson, 3 M.J. 139 (C.M.A. 1977). 
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purpose of ensuring due process for service-members tried in courts-martial 
without weakening the military’s critical need to field disciplined and trained 
force.  Mundy v. Weinberger, 554 F. Supp. 811, 820 (DC DC 1983); and United 
States v. Lattrice, 3. U.S.C.M.A. 487, 491 (C.M.A. 1953).  See Rachel E. 
VanLandingham, MILITARY DUE PROCESS:  LESS MILITARY & MORE PROCESS, 94 
TUL. L. REV. 1, 65 (2019).  
In prohibiting unlawful command influence, Congress did not specifically 
list the president, secretary of defense, or service-secretary; however, each of these 
civilian positions may serve as a convening authority and each is vested with the 
mantle of authority to issue lawful orders.  See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 822 (2019); 
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 30 (1827); Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850); 
and Closson v. United States ex rel Armes, 7 App. D.C. 460, 476-77 (CA DC 
1896).  When the traditional executive power (e.g., the power to persuade) is 
injected into the military justice system by the president or any of the other civilian 
authorities in a manner intended to or having the effect of compromising an 
accused service-member’s right to a fair trial, a clear opportunity for unlawful 
command influence exists.  In such situations Article 37 and the Constitution’s 
Fifth Amendment vest this Court with the duty to remedy it.  See e.g., United 
States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242, (C.A.A.F. 2017). 
 
 
7 
Additionally, R.C.M. 104(a)(1) as accepted by the Army Court of Criminal 
Appeals in its decision, United States v. Bergdahl, governs persons not subject to 
the U.C.M.J. but nonetheless vested with the mantle of command authority.  It has 
long been demanded that executive branch agencies, including their leaders, 
comport with the rules of the agency when not in conflict with law.  See, e.g., 
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1959); 
and, United States v. McDonald, 55 M.J. 173, 175 (C.A.A.F. 2001).  Thus, by the 
Department of Defense’s own rules, as promulgated by the president, the president 
is required to refrain from interfering in any respect to the detriment of an accused 
service-member facing a court-martial or in the post-trial processing of a court-
martial in which judge advocates and relevant officers perform the duties of 
assessing the results of the court-martial. 
II.  THE PROHIBITION AGAINST UNLAWFUL COMMAND 
INFLUENCE, A MANIFESTATION OF DUE PROCESS,  PREDATES THE 
UCMJ 
 
Due process in courts-martial is governed by the unique regime of law as 
applied to the necessities of military service and the national defense.  See, e.g. 
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 US 25, 43 (1976).  Unlawful command influence has 
been considered the “mortal enemy of military justice” because it undermines the 
fairness of military trials and the public’s confidence in the same.  United States v. 
Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986).  Such influence exists if a reasonable 
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citizen, knowing all of the facts of a given case, would believe the military justice 
system to be unfair and, as such, lose confidence in the entire system.  N.G. v. 
United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 375, 386 (Fd. Ct. Cl. 2010), citing United States v. 
Lawson, 33 M.J. 946, 950 (N.M.C.M.R. 1991).  Public confidence may be 
undermined by the appearance of unlawful command influence as well.  United 
States v. Stoneman, 57 M.J. 35, 42 (C.A.A.F. 2002).  Most recently, in United 
States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242 (C.A.A.F. 2017), this Court reaffirmed that the 
appearance of unlawful command influence is a toxin equal to that of actual 
unlawful command influence.  Id. at 248.  Legitimacy of the rule of law has long 
been part of due process protections; apparent unlawful command influence erodes 
such systemic legitimacy of the military’s criminal justice processes and hence 
requires redress (even absent Article 37).  
Per this Court’s doctrine, once an accused presents a colorable claim of 
unlawful command influence the government must prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that (1) the predicate facts do not exist; (2) the facts do not constitute 
unlawful influence; or (3) the unlawful influence did not affect the findings or 
sentence.  United States v. Barry, 78 M.J. 70, 77 (C.A.A.F. 2018) citing to United 
States v. Salyer, 72 M.J. 415, 423 (C.A.A.F. 2013).  Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is the highest burden of law in the American system of law.  See, e.g., 
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 795 (1952); Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 
 
 
9 
121, 138 (1954); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526 (1958).  While the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not quantifiable, uncertainty 
regarding facts that are central to an issue before a court inherently undermine the 
government’s ability to meet this high bar.  See, e.g., Burrage v. United States, 134 
S.Ct. 881 (2014).  When the source of unlawful command influence is powerful, 
such as the president, proof that presidential actions did not taint the fairness of the 
proceedings or undermine public confidence in them must be more than outcome 
determinative or the judicial acceptance of statement, including those taken under 
oath, from witnesses, counsel, military judges, or potential jurors.4 
While Article 37 represents specific Congressional condemnation of this 
variant of due process corruption in the military justice setting, there is judicially-
recognized evidence that the prohibition against unlawful command influence 
predates the UCMJ.   In Homcy v. Resor, 455 F. 2d 1345 (CA DC 1971), the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined that improper command 
influence had tainted a World War II court-martial under the 1920 Articles of War 
– to the point of requiring the defense establishment to issue an honorable 
discharge to Homcy.  Id. at 1352.5  Homcy demonstrates that Congress did not 
 
4 Although the creation of the military judge position in 1968 was intended to ensure due process, and military 
judges are statutorily protected from unlawful command influence, Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 179-180 
(1994), they too may be subjected to it.  See, e.g., United States v. Salyer, 72 M.J. 415, 424 (C.A.A.F. 2013). 
5 For more information, see e.g., “World War II Army Officer, Albert C. Homcy Dies at 71”  Washington Post, 
April 3, 1987; and Fred Borch, Misbehavior Before the Enemy and Unlawful Command Influence in World War II:  
The Strange case of Albert C. Homcy, 1 (Army Lawyer, 2014). 
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create a new protection in 1950; the protection already existed to deprive a court-
martial of its jurisdiction as a matter of due process. The 1920 Articles (under 
which Homcy was court-martialed) did not articulate a prohibition against 
unlawful command influence; there is no mention of such influence in any of the 
UCMJ’s predecessor Articles of War.  See, e.g., Luther C. West, A History of 
Command Influence on the Military Justice System, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1, 16 
(1970).6  Yet unlawful command influence formed the basis for a United States 
District Court to grant relief, and for the Court of Appeals to uphold said decision.  
Homcy, 455 F. 2d at 1356. 
Colonel William Winthrop, in his MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, 
observed that military law is partly formed by an unwritten lex non scripta.  
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, 42 (1895).  A small part of this 
unwritten American military law originated in the military experience of the 
Netherlands.  Id. at 5-6.7  The Dutch case of Colonel Moise Pain et Vin highlights 
the incompatibility of executive interference in the military justice process.  During 
 
6 Others have noted the lack of a statutory prohibition against unlawful command influence prior to the Code.  See, 
e.g., Walter T. Cox, The Army, the Courts, and the Constitution:  The Evolution of Military Justice, 118 MIL. L. REV 
1, 10-14 (1987).  Judge Cox noted “Unlike the professional armies of the first century and a half of our history, the 
World War II soldier was a regular citizen….  Almost everyone became exposed in some way or another to the 
military justice system, and many came away not liking what they saw. Some … were also lawyers by profession 
who were shocked at what they experienced, particularly by what they considered to be improper command 
influence.”  Id., at 11.  
7 It should also not be missed that the military reforms of the early Dutch Republic influenced the Swedish military 
of Gustavus Adolphus, and the French military of both Louis IIV and Napoleon Bonaparte.  See, e.g., John A. Lynn, 
Forging the Western Army in Seventeenth Century France, 35-49, in MCGREGOR KNOX, THE DYNAMICS OF 
MILITARY REVOLUTION, 1300-2050 (2001). 
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the Franco-Dutch War (1672-1678), a Dutch court-martial sentenced Colonel Pain 
et Vin to be removed from the military for surrendering his command without 
resistance.8  A public outcry demanded Stadtholder William III mete out “the most 
severe punishment against the colonel;” William therefore required that the high 
military court sentence Pain et Vin to death.  The high military court complied, re-
sentencing Pain et Vin to death.9  Anti-monarchist Republicans later used William 
III’s actions as proof that a stadtholder could not be entrusted with commanding 
the prosecution of crimes through military court; subsequently-elected Dutch 
governments removed common crimes from the military courts, required that 
sentences of death adjudged in military trials, and mandated that stadtholder 
pardons had to be approved by the highest civil court of the Dutch Republic.  The 
Pain et Vin example signifies that even in an emerging democracy, particularly one 
whose practice influenced our military law, sovereign interference in courts-
martial was viewed as degrading both the rights of the accused and of the nation.10 
Moving west, American military law primarily derives from British military 
law.  There have long been constraints against monarchal interference in courts-
 
8 See DONALD HAKS, FATHERLAND AND PEACE: PUBLICITY ABOUT THE DUTCH REPUBLIC AT WAR, 1672-1713.   
(Ttitle translated from Vaderland & Vrede:  Publiciteit over de Nederlandse Republiek in oorlog, 1672-1713), 50.  
The passage is translated from “Men eiste het hoofd de kolonel Pain et Vin als straf voor het verlaten van zjin post.”  
Id., at 50.  See also OLAF VAN NIMWEGEN, THE DUTCH ARMY AND THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONS, 1588-1688, 343 
(2010). 
9 HAKS, AT 23. (Translated from: “Januari werd Pain et Vin in Alphen onthoofd.  Het oorpronkelijke vonnis en het 
verzoek William III tot herziening werden via de drukker van overheid public gemaak.”). 
10 See, e.g., H.H.A. de Graaf, Some Problems of Military Law Which have arisen as a consequence of the use of 
Armies of international Composition by the Republic of the Netherlands, 7 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 229, 234 
(1968). 
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martial, including at the time America was founded.  Limitations on the Crown 
existed beginning with the annual requirement on Parliament to renew the Mutiny 
Acts. See e.g., ALEXANDER TYTLER. AN ESSAY ON MILITARY LAW, AND THE 
PRACTICE OF COURTS MARTIAL, 113 (1806).  In 1689 the Crown’s secretary at war 
insisted that soldiers – as “free citizens” – only surrendered so much of their rights 
as such rights were “incompatible with the discharge of duty as a loyal soldier, 
serving a Constitutional Sovereign.”  See e.g. CHARLES M. CLODE, THE MILITARY 
FORCES OF THE CROWN:  THEIR ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNMENT, 144 (1869) 
[citing to 1689 War Office Circular XXXVIII.].11  
 In 1715, the Earl of Bath, serving as secretary at war, determined that even 
during the 1715 Rebellion, the Crown’s interference in courts-martial through 
revisions of sentences was “terrible” to the law. CLODE, AT 164-65.  Bath further 
determined “[n]othing can be more terrible that that of detaching the military from 
the civil part of our Constitution and establishing in the former a blind obedience 
to the order of their Commander-in-Chief.” 12  Id.  In 1728, the United Kingdom’s 
Attorney General advised that the Crown could not increase the numbers of capital 
offenses unless Parliament first permitted it to do so.  Id., at 148.  Thus, prior to 
 
11 Winthrop cites to Clode throughout Military law and Precedents.  See e.g., Military Law and Precedents, 58 
12 Clode, citing to  Earl of Bath, 165.  Bath also apparently noted:  “A commander in chief who orders a court-
martial to revise their sentence and thereby shows himself displeased with it, has an almost irrestistable influence 
over every member of the Court-martial so that the order of revision is, and often proves to be, an order for altering 
the sentence and making it more severe.”  Id. 
 
 
13 
1789, while the British monarch remained commander-in-chief of the United 
Kingdom’s armed forces, his or her powers over courts-martial were viewed as 
dangerous and in need of policing within the framework of the unwritten British 
Constitution. 
Closer to home, domestic examples of restraints on the president’s military 
justice powers predate the UCMJ.  Article III review of courts-martial prior to 
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 147 (1953) operated on the strict habeas test which 
limited judicial review to the singular question of whether a court-martial 
possessed jurisdiction over the military accused.13  Despite this limitation, the 
Supreme Court held that presidential and War Department deficiencies could 
deprive a court-martial of jurisdiction.  In Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 
(1887) the Court found that in the absence of a presidential approval of a dismissal, 
a retired court-martialed officer was entitled to retain retired status and 
commensurate pension.  In a broad sense, the Court determined that a president’s 
non-compliance with procedural rules rendered a court-martial’s cashiering 
sentence into a nullity.  Hence when law (Article 37), regulation (R.C.M. 104), or 
lex non scripta as it applies to the military law (historic practice), impose a duty on 
the Commander-In-Chief, a presidential failure to refrain from conduct which 
 
13 See, e.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65 (1857); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890); and In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 
157 (1890).   
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undermines the fairness of a court-martial, even if in appearance only, divests the 
court-martial of jurisdiction.  In McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 (1902), the 
Court held that when the Army did not comply with the statutory right of a 
“volunteer officer” accused in a court-martial to have the court-martial composed 
of militia officers, the court-martial was defective so as to deprive it of jurisdiction, 
even where the president had approved the sentence.  Id. at 69.14 
Swaim v. United States 165 U.S. 553 (1897), a case often cited by adherents 
of executive authority, does not, despite inaccurate contrary claims, uphold 
presidential power to interfere in courts-martial by ordering new sentences.  This 
fundamental misunderstanding regarding Swaim is most recently evidenced in the 
dissent in Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2201 [Alito J., dissenting].  
Justice Samuel Alito argued that “until 1920 the President and commanding 
officers could disapprove a court-martial sentence and order that a more severe one 
be imposed instead, for whatever reason.  We twice upheld the constitutionality of 
this practice.”  In addition to Justice Alito’s erroneous “for whatever reason” 
assertion, he missed the important fact that the Swaim Court never addressed the 
constitutionality of the practice of disapproving a court-martial sentence:  it simply 
focused on the limited jurisdiction of federal courts and on the Army’s adherence 
 
14 The requirement of service of militia officers on courts-martial was due to the nation’s fears of presidential power 
over a standing army. 
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to its own procedures.15  It did so because the Court had earlier established in 
Keyes v. United States, 109 U.S. 336 (1883), that as long as a court-martial 
possessed lawful jurisdiction over an accused, the federal judiciary could not 
collaterally review the findings or sentence imposed on the accused, even with 
evidence of procedural irregularities to the accused’s detriment.  Id. at 340.16   
Stated plainly, in Swaim the Court did not uphold the constitutionality of 
President Arthur’s actions; the Court merely held that Arthur’s actions did not 
violate prescribed extant regulations, and therefore the federal judiciary did not 
possess habeas jurisdiction over Swaim’s claim.  Nor did the Court, in either 
Swaim or Ex Parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879) (Justice Alito’s second cite), hold that 
an order for a court-martial to reconvene for the purpose of issuing a stricter 
punishment comported with the Constitution.  To the contrary, the Court in Reed 
held that as long as a naval court-martial had not been “dissolved,” a commander 
could reconvene the court-martial to reconsider a sentence because of a mistake of 
law made by the court-martial.  Id. at 22.   
III.  TEST FOR PRESIDENTIAL UNLAWFUL COMMAND INFLUENCE 
INFORMED BY EXECUTIVE’S BROAD POWER AND ITS HISTORICAL 
RESTRAINTS  
 
15 Moreover, “[t]he Court in Swaim did not indicate what limits, if any, exist on the President’s power to act with 
respect to courts-martial absent statutory authority.”  See Gregory Maggs, Judicial Review of the Manual for Courts-
Martial, 160 MIL. L. REV. 96, 132 (1999). 
16 Earlier, in Wise v. Withers, 7. U.S. 331 (1806), the Court determined that where a court-martial did not possess 
jurisdiction, the judiciary could exercise jurisdiction through habeas.  
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The central focus of the traditional test of determining unlawful command 
influence is whether an accused service-member’s court-martial has been 
improperly influenced by a military commander, or carries the appearance of such 
corrosion.  Remedies available to a military judge, short of dismissal, include 
removing a convening authority from oversight of the court-martial and ordering 
the offending party to cease actions likely to undermine the fairness of the court-
martial.  See, e.g., United States v. Douglas, 68 M.J. 349 (C.A.A.F. 2010); and, 
United States v. Rivers, 49 M.J. 434 (C.A.A.F. 1998).  Importantly, the arsenal of 
remedial measures a military judge would typically consider to counteract the 
appearance of unlawful command influence resulting from the actions or 
statements by commanders in an accused’s hierarchy are simply inadequate to 
mitigate this appearance when the source of the unlawful command influence is the 
President or one of his civilian secretaries.  In such a case, these typical remedies 
will be neither understood nor appreciated by the public, nor even by most 
members of the military’s special society. All that will be considered with regard 
to the unlawful command influence will be the outcome of the court-martial, no 
matter how diligent the military judge may have been in implementing curative 
measures.  Accordingly, a military court should presume that the only remedy that 
can meaningfully neutralize the pernicious appearance of unlawful command 
influence in such situations is dismissal; it should be ordered absent compelling 
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evidence presented by the government that rebuts the presumed necessity for this 
remedy.  
(A)  Broad Presidential Power Includes More Than Ordinary Power to 
Command  
 
An officer, service secretary, secretary of defense, and president are vested 
with the authority to command their forces to conform to orders.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Obligenhart, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 627 (C.M.A. 1954); and United States v. 
Johnson, 17 C.M.A. 246 (C.M.A. 1967).  A service-member subject to the orders 
of a command from a person within their chain of command may be required, for 
example, to exercise at certain hours of the day or wear a certain uniform.  A 
service-member may also be required to report for duty to participate in an 
unpopular conflict.  However, commander-in-chief authority is far more expansive 
than the general authority to command, and not only because a president can order 
forces into foreign lands, remove officers from duty, and depart from the military 
personnel laws in wartime.  See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 123 (2019). 
The President can do far more. For example, in 1957, the Court in  Wilson v. 
Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957), unanimously determined that there was no 
constitutional impediment for a president to cede court-martial jurisdiction to 
foreign criminal jurisdiction, even when such cession was contrary to a status of 
 
 
18 
forces agreement.17  The Court concluded that the 1951 security agreement 
recognizing the military’s primary jurisdiction did not afford Private Girade 
protection against being transferred to Japanese jurisdiction, despite the 
congressional outcry at the time.18  Further examples abound:  for example, the 
vast presidential authority regarding the military can send National Guard forces to 
foreign nations for the purpose of training.  See, e.g., Perpich v. Department of 
Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990); and a service-member may be court-martialed in a 
military operation in foreign lands even when the operation is not sanctioned by 
Congress.  See, e.g., Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416 (1922).19   
Indeed, the federal judiciary will not take up challenges to jurisdiction over 
questions involving the use of the military overseas.  See, e.g., Campbell v. 
Clinton, 203 F. 3d 19 (CA DC 2000).  Nor will the federal courts grant 
congressional standing to challenge a president’s refusal to comply with 
international agreements such as United Nations sanctions against an unpopular or 
“illegal regime.”  See, e.g., Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F. 2d 461 (CA DC 1972).  Each of 
these decisions enable the possibility of the president ordering military forces into 
 
17 Girard originated from a challenge to the Eisenhower Administration transfer of an America soldier into Japanese 
jurisdiction. Id., at 525.   
18 354 U.S.., at 530.   
19 In Collins, the Appellant raised secondarily the fact that he was ordered to Vladivostok in a mission not directly a 
part of the war against Germany.  Though the Court did not directly address this issue, the majority called it 
“trivial.”  Collins, 258 U.S. at 421.  See JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, TO RAISE AND DISCIPLINE AN ARMY:  MAJOR 
GENERAL ENOCH CROWDER, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S OFFICE AND THE REALIGNMENT OF CIVIL AND 
MILITARY RELATIONS IN WORLD WAR I, 242 (2017). 
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a foreign conflict where they remain subject to presidential orders as well as the 
full jurisdiction of the UCMJ.  This is because the President may also send military 
forces into an undeclared war without judicial determination.  See Mora v. 
McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) [Stewart J., dissenting]. 
In this light, the President may also order service-members to wear uniforms 
with insignia not a part of the United States.  See United States ex rel. New v. 
Rumsfeld, 448 F.3d 403 (CA DC 2006).  And, with a congressional authorization, 
the president may proscribe rules compelling citizens into military service.  See 
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).  Apart from constitutional and statutory 
Commander-In-Chief authorities known to this Court, the president also has 
apparent powers resulting from the non-justiciable political question doctrine to 
include removing the United States from a treaty obligation.  See Goldwater v. 
Carter, 444 U.S. 966 (1979).20  A failure of a service-member to comply with 
presidential authority in such instances remains a refusal to follow orders.   
(B)  Lex Non-Scripta:  Earlier Presidents Respected Unlawful Influence 
Rubicon 
   
Regarding lex non-scripta, several presidents determinedly remained 
publicly aloof from military trials, courts of inquiry, and investigations.  In 1942, 
President Franklin Roosevelt asked Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts to lead 
 
20 Absent a judicial role in foreign policy disputes, Goldwater’s political question doctrine can potentially affect 
where the military is sent. 
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an investigation into the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  Roberts’s presence on 
such an important board (while implicating judicial ethics and separation of 
powers), gave confidence to the public that Roosevelt would be unable to direct the 
investigation to a specific result.  See John J. McCloy, Owen J. Roberts Extra 
Curiam Activities, 104 U. PENN. L. REV., 350, 352 (1955).21   
Harry S. Truman was president during the well-publicized court-martial of 
Major General Robert Grow, who was accused of permitting Soviet capture of 
classified information.  The historic record contains no substantive statements from 
Truman regarding the court-martial; in response (during trial) to a reporter’s 
questions on the political activities of generals, Truman responded:  “I have no 
comment.  The Army is handling that.”22  Three other historic examples are 
important in this regard. 
First, following the Army’s defeat at Battle of the Wabash on November 4, 
1791, President George Washington had the opportunity to subject General Arthur 
St. Clair to public approbation or court-martial, but did neither.23  St Clair sought a 
court of inquiry to clear his name; this could have resulted in a court-martial.  See 
 
21 See HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, 79th 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 2967 (1946). That Roberts dissented in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 
[Roberts J., dissenting] evidences that he was independent in assessing Roosevelt’s wartime decisions.  Roosevelt 
was not alone in appointing justices to serve on military investigations. We do not argue that the Roberts inquiry 
was “full and fair,” but rather, only that Roberts’s leadership likely prevented direct presidential interference. 
22 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1952, 416 (1959). 
23 For a recitation on the defeat and Congress’ actions, see, John Yoo, George Washington and the Executive Power 
5 U. St. Thomas J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1, 19-21 (2010). 
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WILEY SWORD, PRESIDENT WASHINGTON’S INDIAN WAR:  THE STRUGGLE FOR THE 
OLD NORTHWEST, 201-02 (1974).  The Wabash defeat was troubling to the nation’s 
security and to the public’s confidence in the military; hence Congress, for the first 
time, investigated the War Department.  Washington, who could have turned St. 
Clair into a scapegoat, instead stated that “General S. Clair shall have justice, I will 
hear him without prejudice, he shall have full justice.”  Id.  
Second, from November 25, 1862 through January 22, 1863, the Army 
court-martialed General Fitz John-Porter for disobeying lawful orders and 
misbehavior before the enemy at the Second Battle of Manassas.  While Judge 
Advocate General Joseph Holt’s conduct (as well as Secretary of War Stanton’s) 
during and after the trial has come under question, at no time did President 
Abraham Lincoln issue a public statement on the trial to Porter’s detriment or 
demand the court-martial reach a specific result.  See DONALD R. JERMANN, FITZ-
JOHN PORTER:  SCAPEGOAT OF SECOND MANASSAS, 190 (2009).24 
Finally, on April 1, 1971, White House Counsel John Dean advised 
President Richard Nixon (a president with less respect for the law then Washington 
and Lincoln) to refrain from taking action before the Army Court of Military 
 
24 See REVERDY JOHNSON, REPLY TO THE REVIEW OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL JOSEPH HOLT, OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS, FINDING, AND SENTENCE OF THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL:  IN THE CASE OF MAJOR GENERAL FITZ 
JOHN PORTER, AND A VINDICATION OF THAT OFFICER (1863); and JOSHUA E. KASTENBERG, LAW IN WAR, LAW AS 
WAR:  BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSEPH HOLT AND THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT IN THE CIVIL WAR 
AND EARLY RECONSTRUCTION, 78-93 (2011). 
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Review and convening authority had acted on Lieutenant William Calley’s 
conviction.  Among the reasons Dean listed for refraining from presidential action 
was Article 37.  Dean warned, “[a]ny presidential statement about the specifics of 
this case would be subject to criticism as an exertion of unlawful command 
influence.”25  Although Nixon later granted Calley some relief (in that he ordered 
Calley into house arrest), he refrained from making public comments that had the 
potential to affect the military appeal process either to the detriment of Calley or 
the prosecution.26  In comparison, in 1971, Nixon publicly commented on his 
belief of Charles Manson’s guilt in his pending California murder trial.  However, 
his aide Ronald Zeigler quickly disavowed any presidential intent to influence the 
jury.27  When juxtaposing Nixon’s conduct toward Calley with his Manson 
 
25 While Dean did not conclude that a president was bound by Article 37, he cautioned that presidential statements 
that could be taken as a directive to the military chain of command involved in the Calley court-martial “would run 
counter to the spirit of the prohibition against unlawful command influence.”  See Dean to Nixon, April 1, 1971 on 
file with authors and available at 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/2qmjg2oc20fp296/AAA25VjGws_EggH6N0rkDsg8a?dl=0  We agree with the “spirit” 
of Dean’s advice, but believed his conclusion that Article 37 did not apply to the President to be in error. 
26 See, Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 214-220 (CA 5, 1975).  On December 8, 1970, in response to a reporter’s 
question, Nixon conceded that a “massacre” had occurred and then stated:  “That's why I'm going to do 
everything…to see that all the facts in this incident are brought to light and that those who are charged, if they are 
found guilty, are punished.”  Nixon did not name Calley in this statement.   On April 16, 1971 Nixon, in a press 
conference, in response to a question predicated on the prosecutor claiming he had undermined military justice by 
not requiring Calley to be imprisoned, stated “Captain Daniel is a fine officer, and incidentally, the six members of 
that court had very distinguished military records.  Five of the six, as you know, Mr. Risher, served with distinction 
in Vietnam.”  On April 29, 1971 in response to another press conference question on why he intervened in the 
Calley case, Nixon responded.  “Well Mr. Jarriel, to comment on the Calley case, on its merits, at a time when it is 
up for appeal would not be a proper thing for me to do, because, as you know, I have indicated I would review the 
case at an appropriate time in my capacity as the final reviewing officer.”  Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
United States, Richard M. Nixon, 537 (1971). 
27 See Ken W. Clawson, “Nixon Slips Refers to Manson as Guilty:  Criticizes Coverage of Trial,” Washington Post, 
August 4, 1970, pg 1. 
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statements, a degree of presidential caution over influencing the military justice 
system is apparent. 
(C)  Fear of Standing Armies Is Fear of Unrestrained Commander-In-Chief  
 
Congress and the federal judiciary have acknowledged that the fear of 
standing armies was an original fear of the framers and shaped military law.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)28; and United States v. Culp, 
14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 202 (C.M.A. 1963).29  This fear emanated from similar 
English Whig concerns.30  See Earl F. Martin, America’s Anti-Standing Army 
Tradition and the Separate Community Doctrine, 76 MISS. L. J. 135, 145-147 
(2005); and, THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 350 
(1868).  The Founders’ concern extended beyond textual checks on a standing 
army; the framers were equally fearful of a potential Commander-in-Chief who 
abused his constitutional authority over the Army they provided, and afraid how 
such abuse could suppress democracy.  See, e.g., James Madison, “Speech at the 
 
28 In Miller, the Court recognized “the sentiment of the time strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view 
was that adequate defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militia – civilians primarily, soldiers on 
occasion.”  United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
29 Delegate Edmund Randolph noted at the Virginia ratifying convention “there was not a member of the federal 
convention who did not feel indignation" at the idea of a standing army. 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 401 (1901). 
30 Furthermore, these concerns were deeply rooted in the Framers’ English legal heritage. In 1697 John Trenchard 
warned that where there is a standing army, “the King is a perpetual General, may model the Army as he pleases, 
and [it] will be high treason to oppose him.”  TRENCHARD, AN ARGUMENT SHEWING THAT A STANDING ARMY IS 
INCONSISTENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ENGLISH MONARCH (1687).  Trenchard also argued that a sovereign’s 
use of standing armies could lead to the destruction of a constitution.  In 1642 John March articulated Parliament’s 
claim that the Crown could not be considered a supreme commander over the militia.  See e.g., JOHN MARCH, AN 
ARGUMENT, OR DEBATE IN LAW, OF THE GREAT QUESTION CONCERNING THE MILITIA, AS IT IS NOW SETTLED BY 
ORDINANCE OF BOTH THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT (1642).  Note:  This treatise is available for viewing at the Library 
of Congress, Rare Books Collection, 
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Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia,” 26 June 1787, in Max Farrand, ed., 
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. I (1911), 465; and, Elbridge 
Gerry, 1st Congress, 17 August 1789, in Annals of Congress, vol. 1 (1834), 750.31  
The founders understood that it was not the standing army per se that 
presented a danger to liberty, but instead the exploitation of that army by those in 
high authority.  This was indeed their bitter experience under the authority of the 
Crown.  Coupled with the fear of standing armies, and only for the purposes of this 
argument, is the ancient principle that neither a monarch nor a president is above 
the law.  In Entick v Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep R 807 (1765), Lord Camden 
established the rule important to constitutional law that a sovereign may only act in 
accordance with the established law.  While Entick has usually been cited in Fourth 
Amendment analysis, it has also been incorporated into military law.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Hillan, 26 C.M.R. 771 (N.M.C.M.R. 1958).32  It is for this reason 
that this court must be especially vigilant in response to any abuse of authority by 
the President acting in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief that relates to the 
 
31 See also David S. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb – A 
Constitutional History, 114 Harv. L. Rev, 941, 1017-1019 (2008); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23-27 (1957). 
Justice Black’s recitation of the historic fear of standing armies is applicable here; he noted that the framers 
understood that military trials possess a greater danger of being arbitrary in the application of due process than 
civilian criminal trials.  In Appellant’s case, President Trump’s declaratory statements against Appellant evidence a 
Commander-In-Chief willing to ignore other constitutional constraints important to the command and supervision of 
the Armed Forces. 
32 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) is an early judicial ruling in which a United States 
court determined that a President was subject to the law of the courts.  Chief Justice John Marshall, while acting as a 
circuit judge, determined that President Jefferson was not immunized from giving testimony on important matters 
under adjudication.  See, Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PENN. L. REV.1383, 1385 (1974).  
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administration of military justice.  Such vigilance plays a vital role in the mosaic of 
checks and balances our founders believed would prevent such abuses of power. 
CONCLUSION 
President Trump’s statements in regard to Appellant have, at a minimum, 
created the aura of a military order directing a specific result and have undermined 
public confidence in the military justice system.  Because of the immensity of 
presidential power over the military and the magnitude of the influence his 
statements and actions have on the perception of fairness in the military justice 
process, due process and its incarnation in the unlawful command influence test 
must consider the historic and constitutional concerns of presidential power over 
the military.  Dismissal should accordingly serve as the presumptive remedy when 
a president, such as here, commits apparent unlawful command influence.  As 
such, in this instance, the Court should afford Appellant the relief he seeks on the 
certified unlawful command influence issue. 
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